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This article discusses a problem of 'toxic' derivative financial instruments (TDIs) 
which occurred in Poland in 2007/2008 between Polish banks and some exporters, 
with the structure of a typical derivative instrument (call/put options) being firstly 
described. Many of them were 'exotic', i.e. previously unknown to Polish 
companies. Nevertheless, banks offered these instruments as products of advanced 
financial engineering innovations. Limited knowledge about such instruments was 
the main factor in causing further enterprises' problems. Many companies 
declared bankruptcy in the effect of changes on the foreign exchange market or 
suffered from serious financial problems. General losses of Polish companies from 
'toxic' financial instruments are estimated at EUR 1.5 to as much as 20 billion. 
This article discusses character of relations between banks and enterprises, 
arising from the derivative transactions. The article analyzes two main issues: (a) 
asymmetry of the option structure hedging exporters against a foreign currency 
risk for a narrow corridor of an exchange rate level and (b) lack of knowledge 
about consequences of a contracted derivative transaction presented by the 
exporters. A case of a transaction carried out by a major Polish company and a 
leading bank on the Polish market is described and analyzed. Analysis of this case 
                                                 
*  This paper has been accepted for publication in Management – Journal of Contemporary 
Management Issues, within the cooperation with the Tempus project Fostering 
Entrepreneurship in Higher Education – FoSentHE (http://web.fosenthe.efzg.hr/Home), i.e. 
its activity related to international scientific conference Innovation driven entrepreneurship – 
BMRA 2010 (http://www.ism.lt/bmra/2010/). The conference has been organized by the 
Tempus project partner – ISM University of Management and Economics in Lithuania. Papers 
presented at the conference were evaluated for publication in different official journals of the 
conference, including Management – Journal of Contemporary Management Issues. 
** Jan Rak, PhD, Warsaw University, Faculty of Management, Institute of Finance and  
Accounting, Ul. Szturmowa 1/3, 02-678 Warszaw, Poland, E-mail: jrak@mail.wz.uw.edu.pl    
Management, Vol. 16, 2011, 1, pp. 91-113 
J. Rak: Innovations in the financial sector - The case of exotic foreign exchange options on the… 
 
92 
confirms the hypotheses that structure of options transactions produce unequal 
distribution of risk between enterprises and banks.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
The accession of Poland to the European Union began a period of 
stabilization and improvement of the Polish zloty in relation to the world’s main 
currencies. During the period of 2004 – 2008, the euro rate fell from more than 
4.5 to 3.2 in Polish zlotys. The many-year downswing of the EU currency 
caused an increased interest of Polish entities in a possibility of securing 
themselves against any further disadvantageous rate changes. Exporters, 
especially, became open to opportunities offered by contemporary financial 




Figure 1. Euro/Polish zloty exchange rate 
 
Source: www.money.pl   
 
As an effect of these tendencies, there was an increased number of 
protection transactions between the Polish exporters and financial institutions – 
mainly banks1
                                                 
1 Banks strictly connected with international financial groups (BRE Bank SA, ING Bank SA and 
BPH SA) were leading in such transactions. These banks prepared the derivatives' distributing 
system on their own. Other Polish banks participated in transactions as representatives of foreign 
financial institutions.  
. They were especially popular in 2007 and 2008. It can be easily 
noticed that the trend of the euro/zloty exchange rate reversed in September - 
October 2008.  From that moment on, many Polish enterprises began to suffer 
from serious problems arisen from their earlier transactions of the purchase/sale 
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of derivatives, mainly currency options. Soon it turned out that many firms had 
to bear considerable financial costs resulting from the service of these contracts. 
The fact that their problems only started was an additional piece of “bad luck” 
because their contracts had long-term negative consequences2
 
.  
It is difficult to estimate the full scale financial effects of these transactions 
for non-financial entities because of the lack of reliable official data. Estimates 
are extremely varied: the Polish financial supervision estimated consequences 
of a phenomenon defined as toxic derivative instruments3 at approximately 15 - 
17 billion Polish zlotys, while some experts believed it to be several dozen 
billion Polish zlotys. However, even if the lowest estimates are true, it is 
impossible to ignore the consequences of using these “toxic instruments” for 
Polish business. In many cases, the matured instruments were being rolled up 
into other options with a prolonged date of maturity4
 
. Thus, the problem was 
not solved, but only postponed in time.  
The options in question were completely new and innovative instruments 
for those Polish entities which took part in the derivative transactions. This 
article discusses the nature of those derivative contracts and points out elements 
of unnoticed risks responsible for the losses of non-financial entities. The author 
also wants to explain why decision makers in many major business entities 
failed to notice the dangers of those derivative instrument transactions. 
 
2. EXCHANGE RATE AND PROBLEMS OF POLISH EXPORTERS 
 
The exchange rate tendencies observed from 2004 - 2008 created a threat 
for Polish exporters. The decline of the euro rate negatively influenced their 
income from those export sales which were denominated in the domestic 
currency. This situation encouraged exporters to protect themselves against a 
negative impact of changes in the exchange rates.  
                                                 
2 In some cases analyzed by the author, there was a two-year span from the contracting to the 
maturity of a transaction. 
3 The term „toxic derivative instruments” was originally used as a description of the American 
CDO’s connected with mortgage loans. Many Polish specialists used the same name for 
derivatives transactions contracted in Poland during 2007 and 2008, especially for the barrier 
option transactions. The similarity between the American and Polish TDI’s arises from an 
unrecognized risk of both instruments.   
4 According to The Polish Financial Authority report: “Podstawowe wnioski z analizy 
zaangażowania przedsiębiorstw w walutowe instrumenty pochodne”, issued in March 2009). This 
report comments on the effects of foreign exchange option transactions in Poland. PFA estimated 
general losses of Polish exporters at 4-7 billion zlotys. See: http://www.knf.gov.pl/ 
opracowania/sektor_bankowy/raporty_i_opracowania   
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The exporters had many available solutions which could be used to protect 
companies against a decline of the foreign currency rate - e.g. forward or futures 
contracts, currency swaps or exchange rate options. In reference to the last ones, 
the simplest strategy was using the plain vanilla currency put option. When 
buying a put option based on an agreed exchange rate, its buyer has a guarantee 
of receiving at least the incomes exchanged at the execution rate established in 
the contract, even in case of the plexus of unfavourable conditions on the 
currency market. This kind of option also gives an opportunity to resign from 
this currency exchange transaction if it was disadvantageous for its owner. 
Thus, the settlement of payments at the maturity for such options can be defined 
as: "The buyer will obtain income no smaller than…". 
 
However, if exporters wanted to protect themselves by opening a long 
position in a put option, they should pay an option premium, which would 
influence the efficiency of this protection. Let’s assume that for an option worth 
EUR 1 million and the execution rate of 3.50 Polish zloty per euro, the put 
premium amounts to 50 000 zlotys.  An exporter executing this option can have 
an effective exchange rate of 3.45 zloty per euro. 
 
As a result of the disadvantage in premium payments, Polish banks 
proposed other, more complicated option transactions. These transactions 
usually included a composition of two options - put and call - contracted 
simultaneously.  Thus, a non-financial entity “bought” a put option and “sold” a 
call option. As an effect of such a structured transaction, the exporter was 
obliged to pay the put option premium, but was entitled to receiving the call 
option premium. Consequently, mutual obligations and charges between a bank 
and a non-financial entity led to the common compensation of payments. Banks 
called these transactions non-cost options or zero-cost options. The reason for 
such transactions can be explained using a quotation by a representative of the 
Polish Financial Supervision Authority: “How can we cut exchange rate 
security costs by purchasing a put option? By issuing a corresponding call 
option. If the firm believes that the future exchange rate of the euro will not rise 
above a certain level, then it accepts that the realization of such a call option is 
also unlikely. However, this option’s price is lower than the put option’s, so in 
order to refinance the full protection provided by the put option, it is necessary 
to issue multiple call options…”5
 
. An example of a similar transaction and a 
settlement of its payment is presented below: 
                                                 
5 An interview with Stopczynski A., the Head of the PFA Banking Supervisory, presented in the 
journal: “Gazeta Parkiet”, Warszawa, 10.06.2010.  
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If an exporter does not have sufficient liquidity to pay the premium for a 
put option, he or she could accept the bank proposal so that instead of the 
payment for the option, he or she would issue a currency call option in the 
interest of the bank. In such a situation, it was acknowledged that a premium of 
the put option (payable by the non-financial entity) and the call option (payable 
by the bank) were equal and would cancel themselves out. Accepting that a rate 
of the execution of the put option is equal to 3.50 zlotys for 1 euro, the 
execution rate of the call option is 3.80, and the spot currency rate at the 
moment of contracting these transactions amounts 3.65 - the settlement of both 
options will depend on the euro rate at the moment of both options' execution  
(the same execution term)6. 
 
 
Figure 2. Purchase of the put option and the sale of the call option by the exporter 
 
Source: http://www.alphafs.com.pl/php/dokumenty/baza_plikow_71.pdf    
 
If the exchange rate gets below 3.50, then the put option will be activated 
and the exporter will have the right to sell the currency for an execution rate 
warranted beforehand. At a rate of above 3.80, the call option will be activated, 
which will cause the obligation of the non-financial subject to sell the currency 
at that rate at its maturity term. In the area between 3.50 and 3.80, none of the 
options will be executed. The schema described above is an illustration of a 
security which uses a rate-corridor in the presented borders. Such a corridor 
strategy seems safe and attractive for exporters – they acquire protection against 
the fall of exchange rates. Additionally, a purchase of these put options entails 
no initial expenses. However, a more detailed analysis of this scenario reveals a 
few of its less obvious traits: 
 
                                                 
6 Based on discussion in the following source: http://www.alphafs.com.pl/php/dokumenty/ 
baza_plikow_71.pdf  
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• Equivalency of the transaction – both in the example and in practice, 
call and put options were selected in order to assure the compensation 
of payments between both sides of the transaction. This means that a 
premium of put should be equal to a premium of call. However, there 
are many factors which may affect the final value of these premiums 
(the spot rate, the execution rate, their date of completion, the 
variability of the exchange rate, changes of the variability, interest 
rates of local and foreign currencies, and many others). As a result, the 
price equality of both premiums is not certain. This inequality can be 
additionally deepened by the fact that, in practice, denominations of 
put and call were usually different in favour of the latter. 
 
• The certainty of export incomes - exporters treated option deals as a 
protection of expected export incomes. In many cases, those incomes 
were never received, so options served as a speculative no hedging 
instrument. Such a situation was often the result of the general 
economic crisis and the decline in the international trade volume. 
However, partly, it was also an effect of the construction of the option 
transactions, mainly a long period of their duration. There were many 
cases when such transactions spanned a period of about two years. It is 
virtually impossible to foresee either long-term export earnings or 
future changes in exchange rates.  
 
• Obscurity of the character of transaction - non-financial entities 
were not prepared for estimating the possible results of these 
transactions. This was caused by many factors, but the confidence in 
banks and in products offered by them was crucial. Banks, however, 
did not make much effort to reliably inform customers about possible 
threats related to the offered products (Karkowski, 2009, pp.168-170). 
The aims of the exporters and the banks in the option transactions were 
therefore different because the banks were interested in maximizing 
their gains on transactions and commissions in the increase of sale 
volume and in attracting new customers by offering them seemingly 
“attractive” products. Many specialists indicated also a lack of proper 
care for preserving individual relations as described by the Good Bank 
Customs' rules (Karkowski 2009, p.167-168). This negligence 
appeared also in the pseudo-professionalism of the bank personnel, 
offering toxic products.  
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3. BARRIER OPTIONS - A NEW ELEMENT ON THE POLISH 
MARKET OF DERIVATIVES 
 
The case of the protection against the exchange risk by using “plain 
vanilla” options was quite rarely applied in real-life transactions made from 
2007 - 2008. In those deals, banks often used derivative exotic options, mainly 
barrier options. These instruments are more complicated, not so much with 
respect to their construction, as with respect to their valuation, as well as the 
estimation of risk resulting from these transactions. 
  
There are two factors of exotic option market development. As in the case 
of classical derivatives, the development of exotic instruments was caused by 
creating theoretical models allowing to valuate some exotic options. In 1973, 
Merton presented a model of the valuation of barrier put options with an exit 
down barrier. This model was developed for the valuation of other barrier 
options. Yet, in the 1970s, there also appeared some other valuation models:  
• the composed options (the Geske model), 
• the backward options (the Goldman, Sosin and Gatto model), 
• the conversion options (the Margrabe model). 
 
In the ’80s of the last century, other models were also built; among others, 
the Stulz model (the valuation for the option founded on the maximum or the 
minimum of two basic instruments) and the Ingersoll model (the first model for 
the valuation of Asiatic options).  
 
The second factor which favoured the dissemination of exotic options was 
a quick implementation of such instruments by financial institutions. 
Practitioners soon adopted models of the theoretical valuation of exotic options 
and it became an impulse for the creation of similar products and offering them 
at the financial market. Their popularity was further increased by the fact that 
such instruments provided individual investors with greater flexibility, as they 
could be easily adapted to any individual investor's needs (Napiorkowski 2001, 
pp.6-12). The market of exotic instruments had been developing dynamically 
since the ’80s of the last century. The slowdown in the exotic instruments 
market started only in the middle of the ’90s after several spectacular 
bankruptcies of significant financial institutions were caused by the use of 
derivatives. However, as Napiórkowski wrote, “… today it's Asiatic options, 
barrier options, basket options, binary options and rainbow-hued options which 
are important. Goods, exchange rates, shares, share indexes, indebted 
securities, and interest rates – they are all used as basic instruments on the 
exotic options market.” (Napiorkowski, 2001, pp.44-45).   
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Defining exotic options is not easy, mainly because of a wide variety of 
their conditions. Generally, an accepted definition is the opposite of the 
classical options – exotic ones are contracts warranting a different function of 
their payment from standard put/call options (Kuzmierkiewicz, 1999). 
 
In Polish financial practice, many transactions were based on a group of 
exotic barrier options. Barrier options are different from the classical instrument 
because of a single additional condition: an activation or deactivation barrier. 
The barrier is a level of the basic instrument price which, if crossed, decides of 
either the expiration of an option before its maturity or its activation. A level of 
this barrier is an additional component of the contract defined at the moment of 
its signing. The value of a barrier option depends on the price of its basic 
instrument during the whole life-time of the option, not only at its maturity. The 
appearance of the condition in the form of crossing the barrier “switches on” 
(knock-in option) or “switches off” (knock-down option) the possibility of the 
execution of this option contract at its maturity. 
 
There are two basic types of barriers. An option of the knock-in type can be 
executed if its basic instrument reaches the barrier during its life period (from 
contracting to maturity). A barrier option becomes a standard option after 
reaching the barrier level and if it terminates in-the-money, its possessor 
receives a payment agreed-upon in the option contract. 
 
A knock-out option deactivates if during the duration of its contract, the 
value of its basic instrument reaches the level set as a barrier. If the barrier is 
reached, the option deactivates just like a classical put/call one. It is not 
important whether during the contract's duration the basic instrument reaches or 
crosses the level set as the barrier. If the exit barrier is reached, the option 
deactivates regardless of what will happen to the price of the basic instrument in 
the future (Napiorkowski, 2001, pp. 44-45). 
 
Additionally, the barriers can be divided into barriers of the down type 
(activation or deactivation of the option happens when the price of the basic 
instrument crosses the mark barriers) or the in type (the activation or 
deactivation of the option happens when the price of the basic instrument 
reaches the levels above the set barrier). According to the above-mentioned 
divisions, one can present the typology of barrier options presented in Table 1. 
 
This division can be broadened by including put and call options. Thus, the 
basic classification of barrier options includes eight types of these instruments, 
depending on their kind of barriers and options.  
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Source: Chriss (1997, p. 437). 
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4. PROTECTION OF EXPORTS EARNINGS BY ZERO-COST 
BARRIER OPTIONS  
 
An analysis of protecting transactions against the risk of exchange rates on 
the Polish market indicates that since the beginning, exporters have been using 
forward contracts. Over time, banks started to offer more complicated products 
(options, swaps, option pairs), including barrier options. First, put options with 
a down & out barrier were offered to exporters. The argument was that there 
was only a small chance of the exchange rate in question to reach their barriers. 
However, such options were still treated as a method of protection against the 
fall of foreign currencies' exchange rates, and the cost of such a barrier option 
was lower than the cost of a standard put option. Below, the author presents an 
example of how such options could be used as a hedging instrument.  
 
If the spot exchange rate is 3.85 zlotys for 1 euro, an exporter can protect 
against a fall of the euro rate by purchasing a plain vanilla put option with the 
execution rate of 3.70 or alternatively - a barrier put option with the execution 
rate at the same level and the knock-out barrier of 3.60. For the denomination 
for both options, being, e.g. EUR 1 million, the premium for plain vanilla is 50 
000 zlotys. However, a barrier option premium is 30 000 zlotys7
 
. A function of 
exercising the settlement of these contracts is presented by the following figure.  
 
Figure 3. Purchase of the put option with the down & out barrier 
 
Source: http://www.alphafs.com.pl/php/dokumenty/baza_plikow_71.pdf  
 
If on the execution date a spot exchange rate was below 3.60, the barrier 
option would not be activated. In the same situation, the plain vanilla option 
would give the right to sell 1 euro for 3.70 zloty. Between 3.60 and 3.70 zloty 
                                                 
7 Based on discussion in the following source: http://www.alphafs.com.pl/php/dokumenty/ 
baza_plikow_71.pdf 
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per euro, the barrier option is more effective - e.g. for the rate of 3.65, the 
effective selling exchange rate of the currency would be 3.62 for the barrier 
option and 3.60 for the plain vanilla option. If the execution rate was above 
3.70, then both options would generate no payment for the exporter - he would 
lose the option rights. Despite that, using the barrier option for protection 
against exchange rate risk is sometimes unsafe. 
 
As an illustration of this thesis, the following comment can be quoted: 
“This strategy of using the down & out option is completely senseless and 
useless from the point-of-view of any exporter. Such a strategy does not provide 
protection against risk, but only raises it even more. The exporter defends 
himself against the strengthening of the domestic currency – therefore, why 
would he have to agree on the condition that if the domestic currency 
strengthens considerably, he loses all the protection?! This is a typical 




A down & out put option could be used as a hedging instrument only if we 
assume a very small variability of an exchange rate. Such an assumption could 
not be made for the period of 2007/2008 in Poland, when the historic variability 
of the euro on the currency market fluctuated between 0.17 and 0.21 zloty; thus, 
options with similar parameters and a down & in barrier or plain vanilla options 
would be a better solution for most exporters. However, according to the results 
of the transaction analyses, this solution has not been applied. 
 
Instead of that, banks frequently proposed a compound strategy of two 
barrier options - a purchase of a put option with a down & out barrier and a sale 
of a call option with an up & in barrier, which turned out to be a very risky 
solution. The use of this compound strategy causes the protection against the 
fall of the exchange rate to be limited only to a narrow change corridor. Out of 
this corridor, such a put option is deactivated and it does not protect against any 
exchange risk. What is more, an activation of the call option causes a 
theoretically unlimited risk for an exporter. The previous example can be 
broadened, with the assumption that, at the same time, the exporter buys a 
barrier put option and sells a call option with the execution price of 4.00 zlotys, 
and an up & in barrier at the level of 4.10 zlotys per euro9
 
. 
                                                 
8 Source: Zajac, D. (2008): Artykuł edukacyjny - Ściągawka dla eksportera (opcje barierowe), 
http://www.alphafs.com.pl/php/dokumenty/baza_plikow_71.pdf 
9 Based on discussion in the same source.  
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Figure 4. Purchase of a barrier put option and sale of a barrier call option 
 
Source: http://www.alphafs.com.pl/php/dokumenty/baza_plikow_71.pdf  
 
If the exchange rate at maturity is lower than 3.60 zloty per euro, the 
exporter loses the protection as the result of reaching the exit barrier. Between 
3.60 and 3.70, the put option can be executed and the non-financial entity can 
sell the euro currency at 3.70 zloty per euro. Between 3.70 and 4.10, both 
options work. However, if the exchange rate is above 4.10, the exporter is open 
to the exchange risk because he/she must sell the currency below the market 
price at 4.00 zloty per unit.  
 
Despite these reservations, there were many transactions contracted on the 
Polish market which were compounded in different proportions of the down & 
out put options and up & in call options. The selection of options to such 
transactions was based on a non-cost (zero-cost) approach guaranteed by banks; 
in other words, the equivalency of put and call option premiums. The zero-cost 
approach often justified a slight differentiation in denominations of put and call 
options. The usually greater denomination of call options was explained as the 
result of the fact that a call option was cheaper than a put option of the same 
denomination. As Karkowski (2001, p. 75): writes: “… nobody paid anyone at 
the moment of contracting the structure. Necessary payments by a purchaser of 
the put option were balanced by the call option premium not paid to a bank, 
whereat, according to the bank, it was necessary that even a few call options 
were needed to balance a single put option payment. Therefore, we need to 
acknowledge that because of this - rather unimportant - reason (from 0.01 to 
0.10 zlotys ) of the rate of improvement, the customer was forced (because of 
the alleged inaccessibility of other instruments) and in some cases, unknowingly 
accepted the incommensurateness of possible final settlements resulting from 
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'toxic derivatives', and accepted the contracting of a very dangerous call 
option.”  
 
The option structure gave a completely new schedule of the payment at its 
maturity. The schedule of the payment at maturity means the final settlement of 
the option contract at the maturity.  The following figure shows an example of a 
settlement for the options discussed in the previous example. Both are 
denominated at EUR 1 000 000.  
 
Figure 5. Schedule of the payment of the put option (bought) and call option (sold) 
 
Source: Based on own research. 
 
It is worth noticing an asymmetry of this settlement, disadvantageous for 
an exporter. If the inequality in denominations of put and call was taken into 
account, the asymmetry would be even bigger. Many specialists pointed out that 
banks avoided presenting the payment function during the negotiations about 
the option structure transactions. Many bank clients would probably become 
warier and withdraw from the transaction if they knew its detailed conditions 
and all the contract's consequences. 
 
It is also interesting how banks pressed their clients to take part in such 
zero-cost option transactions. The zero-cost transactions were also offered to 
those entities which were able to pay the put option premium. What is more, in 
2007 and 2008, banks ceased to issue other, non-compound derivatives for 
foreign exchange currency hedging. A tendency of using zero-cost derivatives is 
 Settlement function at maturity 
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also strange in the situation of serious difficulties concerning the compounding 
of such transactions. 
 
5.  OPTION STRUCTURES - TABULA RASA FOR CUSTOMERS 
 
The majority of the contracted option transactions included the compound 
of put and call, mainly barrier options. The buyers of put were mostly exporters, 
as banks purchased call options. However, many derivative transactions held 
from 2007 - 2008 in Poland did not only have an occasional or individual 
character. Those option transactions were often arranged in series. It means that 
an exporter and a bank could contract a series of the put options with different 
maturity and a series of the call options at the same time. Of course, all of them 
were based on the zero-cost approach. For example, the author investigated the 
case of the put/call option transactions maturing every week for a two-year 
period. The deal included 104 down & out put options and 104 up & in call 
options.  
 
Such transactions were more complicated for evaluation than any 
individual put/call transaction. If somebody wanted to calculate the zero-cost 
condition for the whole transaction, he/she would have to estimate all premiums 
for all 208 options at the contracting date. No bank customer had any chance to 
make such an analysis unless he/she was a well-versed financial engineering 
professional. Thus, the bank customer “had to” accept the version of the bank 
officer, who was trying to convince him/her that the presented transaction was 
zero-cost and that it was equally profitable for both sides. What is more, many 
officers were unfamiliar with derivative valuation methods, mostly because they 
were traders and not specialists in derivative construction. It is clear today that 
many of those transactions did not fulfill the zero-cost condition. Difficulties 
with estimating the premium were similar to the difficulties of risk connected 
with such a derivative structure. It was crucial to estimate the probability of net 
payment for a bank or for an exporter. This task is complicated even for a 
professional and virtually impossible for a person who does not usually deal 
with complicated financial instruments and usually lacks the necessary 
computer software. Thus, many clients chose to believe banks which advertised 
those transactions as low-risk ones.  
 
It is true that the better part of the so-called zero-cost option structures did 
not fulfil this criterion. All the more, banks used only a single parameter of the 
transaction for achieving the equilibrium between the premiums of both options. 
It was the relation between the put and call option denominations – one time it 
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was 1 to 2, another time 1 to 10. However, they ignored additional factors 
influencing the premium level.  
 
The opinion above will be confirmed in the next part of the article, which 
discusses a real-life case of such a transaction. The further confirmation of this 
opinion can also be found in existing elaborations of this subject. Based on the 
research carried out by Karkowski (2009), results of the valuations of three 
plain vanilla options, issued by a Polish bank in August 2008, can be quoted. 
 
Table 2. Premiums from the put and call options 
 
 Premiums on 
25. Feb. 2009 
Purchasing by exporter put option (EUR 100.000  per 3.41 zlotys) -  7 000 
Selling by exporter call option (EUR 100.000 per 3.34 zlotys)    4 000 
Selling by exporter call option  (EUR 200.000 per 3.41 zlotys) 12 000 
Premium settlement for exporter  9 000 
 
Source: Karkowski (2009, p. 78). 
 
The estimation was made taking into account both a historical estimation of 
the variability of the exchange market and the level of interest rates at the day of 
contracting the transaction. There is no reason to believe that assumptions made 
by a bank differed significantly from these used by Karkowski (2009). Thus, it 
could be expected that the bank should have known that the transactions did not 
meet the equivalency criterion. As a result, they could hardly be called “zero-
cost”. 
 
6. ANALYSIS OF A CASE OF THE ZERO-COST OPTION 
STRUCTURE 
 
Using the data provided by a Polish enterprise, it was possible to estimate 
the consequences of using the put/call option structure. All transactions were 
made with a bank in the summer of 2008 and included a series of 104 
settlements of option contracts, dropping every week. The entity acquired a 
series of 104 put options, denominated at EUR 500 000, with the execution rate 
of 3.70 zloty per euro for options maturing in 2008, and with the execution rate 
of 3.35 for options maturing in 2009 and 2010. The options included a down & 
out barrier at 3.20 for all options. 
 
The bank acquired (and the non-financial subject issued) 104 call options 
denominated at EUR 1,000,000 with the execution rate of 3.70 zlotys for 
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options maturing in 2008, and the execution rate of 3.35 for options maturing in 
2009 and 2010. The call options included the down & out barrier at the level of 
3.20 zloty per euro. At the moment of contracting the transaction, the spot 
exchange rate was 3.26 zloty per euro. 
 
The presented option structure seems to be symmetrical, because mutual 
charges and obligations of the transaction sides will be terminated, if the rate 
falls below 3.20 (by about 0.06 zloty). However, it did not happen in spite of the 
rate almost rubbing elbows with the barrier (3.2026). After analyzing the 
changes of the exchange rate in 2008 – 2009, it can be noticed that the bank 
customer noted a profit from the structure up to November 2008. From  
10. November 2008, the exchange rate exceeded the 3.70 level, which meant 
the execution of the call option, thus the bank became the beneficiary of the 
transaction.  
 
Such an analysis can be made ex-post when changes on the foreign 
currency market are measured and known. In fact, the increase of the euro-zloty 
exchange rates at the end of 2008 and 2009 were unexpected and no 
professional predicted such a strong reversal of rate trends. However, it is worth 
asking two questions:  
 
• Did bank customers have to be completely helpless and could they not 
show some greater caution concerning the protection of their currency 
transactions?  
 
• Could the tendency of the exchange rate, shown by Figure 1, have been 
predicted? Could losses from the total option structure have been 
avoided? 
 
Of course, the answer to these questions is strictly related to the in-depth 
knowledge of the international currency market. Pursuing this kind of 
knowledge, however, is not a subject of this article. Its purpose is to use the 
analysis of derivatives to explain the consequences of transactions contracted 
between exporters and banks. A starting point of the analysis is the assumption 
that initial prices of the options (premiums) were in some way related to their 
final value at the maturity of options. Such an assumption is nothing new - most 
of the models used for option valuation are based on such premises - from the 
binominal model to more developed models based on complete algebraic 
formulas. This leads us to the conclusion that the analysis of the option 
structures can be carried out based on the valuation of individual options at their 
contracting days. 
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Any option valuation requires accepting certain parameters for individual 
instruments (maturity date, denomination) and some data from the currency 
market (the contracting spot exchange rate, the variability of exchange rates at 
this same moment, stability of the variability, interest rates for the domestic and 
foreign currencies). All necessary data were estimated using the market data 
from the moment of contracting. Several types of data were obtained using the 
historic analysis. As an instrument for the analysis, the author used a well-
known version of the Black-Scholes model, known as the Garmann-Kohlhagen 
model, which is considered very useful for valuating barrier options. (Derman 
& Kani, 1996; Kuzmierkiewicz, 1996; Weron & Weron, 1999). 
 
The carried-out analysis concentrated on three issues: 
 
• whether the contracted option structures fulfilled the zero-cost criteria, 
• whether the temporary option premium schedule confirmed the 
reversal of settlements between the bank and the non-financial subject 
which really took place at the end of 2008, 
• what the probability of suffering losses from the whole of the 
transaction was for the exporter, and what chance of losses the bank 
had. 
 
In the previous part of the article, the reader could find the research by 
Karkowski which shows the existence of disequilibrium between premiums for 
the put and call options contracted in one transaction. This analysis is based on 
the plain vanilla option and confirms that the liabilities of the exporter are lower 
than receivables.  If the settlement of a structure at the contracting date was 
based on a zero-cost approach, then a bank should pay the difference in 
premiums to an enterprise. In fact, the bank did not pay for it, because it treated 
the transaction as zero-cost. However, in this analysis, a slightly different 
methodology should be used. Due to the condition of equivalency, the 
transaction does not apply to each individual pair of put and call options 
dropping at the same moment, thus it is necessary to check the equality of all 
premiums for all the 104 put and call options series. The results of such an 
approach are presented by the Table 3. 
 
Results concerning the option's value at the contracting date indicate the 
rise of the net payment from the bank to the exporter. The amount resulting 
from the difference between the put and call premiums is so huge, that even a 
slight correction of the assumed valuation parameters would not be enough to 
eliminate the discrepancy between payments of both sides. 
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Table 3. Value of the put and call zero-cost option structure premiums  
at the contracting date 
 
Put premiums at contracting date - 1.2 million zlotys 
Call premiums at contracting date 13.8 million zlotys 
Difference in settlements 12.6 million zlotys 
 
Source: Based on own research. 
 
Thus, the valuation of the total option structure confirmed a lack of the 
zero-cost character of the transaction in question. The bank had to know - in the 
author's opinion – about the inequality of payments. According to the 
accounting regulations, banks have to record the derivatives which require their 
proper valuation. It is also interesting that a very similar result of a payment 
difference is reached when examining other transactions of this customer with 
another bank, even though the parameters of options contracted there were 
considerably different. 
 
The dynamic analysis of the net payments from contracted option 
premiums indicated that up to a certain moment, the bank customer had 
benefited from the deal, then the profit moved to the bank's side. Analysis based 
on the data from the contracting day confirmed the possibility of such a 
situation, which actually took place some months later. As an illustration of this 
thesis, the cumulative time distribution of the put and call premiums should be 
used. Their distribution is presented by Figure 6. 
 
The presented statement clearly indicates that the sum of the put premiums 
(the value of the exporter's rights at the moment of contracting the option 
structure) is clearly lower than the amount of liabilities (the value of all call 
option premiums purchased by the bank). The difference nominally amounts to 
exact zlotys (-12 600 000). To put it simply - it could be said that the bank 
should pay the exporter more than 12 million zlotys at the moment of the 
transaction, if it wishes to ensure the zero-cost of mutual settlements. 
Obviously, such a payment has never been made.   
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Figure 6. Time cumulative distribution of put and call premiums 
 
Source: Based on own research. 
 
It might be interesting to take a closer look at the moment of crossing the 
cumulative premiums of put series with the cumulative premiums of calls, 
which is demonstrated by the following figure. 
 
 
Figure 7. Net valuation of following pairs of put and call premiums 
 
Source: Based on own research. 
 
This distribution of the put and call pair net premium values shows that the 
premiums of call became higher than the put premiums after, approximately, the 
20th series. The analysis indicates that after a period of a few months, when the 
exporter had been benefiting from the transaction, he would have entered into a 
period of losses. According to the analysis, the exporter should enter into 
negative settlements after four to five months from contracting the structure, 
which was confirmed in practice. It is surprising that the results of the 
theoretical analysis used in this article closely follow the trends of the exchange 
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rate at the end of 2008 and that it predicted the change of the exporter's 
settlement from positive to negative.  
 
In real life, this shift happened in November 2008. The euro rate reached 
the level above 3.70 zlotys exactly on 10. November, precisely at the same 
moment which was suggested by the analysis performed using the data of five 
months earlier. The analytical framework presented above is not a typical 
instrument for making exchange rate predictions. However, the results of using 
it are satisfactory. All of the model's assumptions are realistic and based on the 
historical distribution of euro rates before July 2008. Even better, the 
conclusions drawn from the valuation were confirmed by the actual tendencies 
at the foreign currency market. These conclusions confirm a lack of equivalence 
in contracted structure option transactions. Therefore, all exporters participating 
in such transactions should be warned against the change of the direction in 
settlements with banks. As we could see, the lack of appropriate analytical tools 
caused many exporters to agree on option structure transactions which 
generated high losses and were later described as "toxic derivatives".   
 
The matter of the risk assessment resulting from contracted transactions is 
another problem which could be investigated by using the model presented 
here. If it is assumed that the net settlements of the following put and call are a 
stochastic (random) variable, it is possible to analyze the distribution of a 
stochastic variable, by using parameters, such as the expected value or standard 
deviation. The net payment probability distribution function for analyzing such 
transactions is presented by the following figure. 
 
Figure 8. Probability distribution function of the net premium settlements 
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As it is shown above, a significant part of the net payment variability is 
located below zero, which suggests that the probability of a negative settlement 
for the exporter was higher than the probability of a positive settlement. The 
exact calculations are presented in the following table.  
 
Table 4. Cumulative distribution function (CDF) for chosen levels of settlements 
 
CDF 0 0.896677 
CDF at put premium average 11 798 0.917015 
CDF at call premium average -133 504 0.451281 
 
Source: Based on own research. 
 
By using the statistical interpretation of the data, it can be said that the 
chances of an exporter suffering losses from the option structure transactions 
are about 89%. The probability of a positive settlement for the exporter is only 
at 11%. This suggests that the banks, arranging the option structure transactions 
could, with a very high probability, expect financially positive results. As 
mentioned above, the banks were probably acquainted with the risk distribution 
inequality, because of the obligation to record such transactions in the books.  
 
The difference between the levels of the cumulative distribution function 
for the average of all put and call settlements - approximately 46% - can be 
interpreted as a degree of certainty for a bank. The degree of certainty explains 
the probability of achieving an average net premium settlement of 133 504 zloty 
from all the transactions in the option structure. It is certain that a bank which 
arranged such an option structure had carried out an estimation of the 
profitability and risks of the contracted derivatives. Probably, such an analysis 
was similar to the one presented in this article. Thus, it can be said that the 
disadvantage resulting from the absence of the equality of settlements and the 
high probability of the loss by the exporter were known to the bank, though 




The idea of a zero-cost option structure was based on purchasing barrier 
put option series, which can be treated as a protecting instrument, as well as on 
selling barrier call option series by exporters. The base instrument for the 
settlement of both options was the euro exchange rate and users could protect 
themselves against the foreign currency risk by buying the put options.  The call 
options were issued to compensate premium payments between banks and their 
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clients. The barrier option structures caused very high losses for exporters and 
afterward they were called "toxic derivative instruments". There are two serious 
issues concerning these so-called “toxic options": 
• The asymmetry of the option structure hedged the non-financial subject 
(the exporter) against a foreign currency risk for a narrow corridor of 
the exchange rate level.  However, the structure also opened the 
exporter to the exchange risk due to the need of issuing the call 
options; 
• The lack of knowledge about the consequences of a contracted 
derivatives transaction presented by the exporters was a reason of 
misinformation and poor decision-making. The banks did not provide 
appropriate information for their clients and failed to inform them 
about the risks resulting from buying and selling options. 
 
The zero-cost option structures contracted at the Polish market did not 
fulfill their protection role and opened the exporters to the unnecessary currency 
risk. This was confirmed by the research results presented in this article. Some 
additional conclusions arising from the research are: 
• lack of equivalency of the transaction which basically relied on the 
higher amount of premiums due for the non-financial subjects 
(exporters); 
• the inevitability of the exchange rate trend reversal in the long period 
and as a consequence of the reversal to the settlements between the 
banks and exporters - from the initial profit to the final loss of the non-
financial subject; 
• the detailed statistical analysis of option structures showed  that the 
probability of suffering the losses by exporters was close to 90%, 
which was also confirmed by the events on the Polish  foreign currency 
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INOVACIJE U FINANCIJSKOM SEKTORU: SLUČAJ "EGZOTIČNIH" 




U ovom se radu raspravlja o problemu "toksičnih" deriviranih financijskih instrumenata, 
kreiranih u Poljskoj, 2007. i 2008. godine, ugovorima između poljskih banaka i nekih 
izvoznih poduzeća. Prvo se opisuje struktura tipičnih deriviranih instrumenata (call/put 
opcija). Mnoge su od njih "egzotične", odnosno prethodno nepoznate poljskim 
poduzećima. Banke su ih, pak, nudile kao rezultat naprednih financijskih inovacija. 
Ograničeno poznavanje ovih instrumenata je bilo glavnim čimbenikom u stvaranju 
daljnjih problema poduzeća. Mnoga od njih su bankrotirala zbog posljedica promjena 
na deviznom tržištu, ili su imala velikih financijskih problema. Ukupni troškovi poljskih 
poduzeća od "toksičnih" financijskih instrumenata procjenjuju se od 1,5 pa do čak 20 
milijardi EUR. U ovom se radu raspravlja o karakteru odnosa između banaka i 
poduzeća, a koji proizlazi iz deriviranih transakcija. Pritom se analiziraju dva temeljna 
pitanja: (a) asimetrija opcijske strukture kojim su izvoznici pokušali smanjiti svoj rizik 
promjene deviznog tečaja u vrlo uskom području te (b) nedostatak znanja o 
posljedicama ugovornih deriviranih transakcija, ponuđenim izvoznicima. Opisuje se i 
analizira slučaj jednog od velikih poljskih poduzeća i vodeće poljske banke, pri čemu se 
potvrđuje hipoteza da struktura opcijskih transakcija stvara nejednaku distribuciju rizika 
između poduzeća i banaka. 
 
 
